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Transferring low tech manufacturing jobs to cheap labour countries is often seen by part of the 
general public and policy makers as a step into the de-industrialisation of the European 
economies. However, several recent contributions have shown that the effects on home 
economies are rarely negative and often positive. Our paper contributes to this literature by 
examining how outward investments to cheap labour countries affect home activities of a sample 
of French and Italian firms that turn multinational in the period analysed. The effects of these 
investments are also compared to the effects of outward investments to developed economies. 
The analysis is carried out by using propensity score matching in order to build an appropriate 
counterfactual of national firms. This provides the hypothetical benchmark of what would have 
happened to domestic activities if firms had not invested abroad. We find no evidence of a 
negative effect of outward investments to cheap labour countries. In Italy they enhance the 
efficiency of home activities, with also positive long term effect on output and employment. For 
France we find a positive effect on the size of domestic activity. Investments to developed 
economies from both countries have essentially scale effects which eventually trickle down on 
employment and productivity at home. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Transferring low tech manufacturing jobs to cheap labour countries is often seen as a step into 
the de-industrialisation of European economies. Consequently, policy makers have increasingly 
been proposing measures aimed at limiting these types of international activities. In France, the 
2005 budget offers subsidies to firms that transfer to France activities previously located outside 
of the European Union. Firms located in French regions highly specialized in one industrial 
activity and suffering from a high level of unemployment could also receive subsidies. Similarly, 
in Italy the government has just passed a new law preventing firms that transfer a substantial part 
of their activities abroad from acceding subsidised public funds to support exports or foreign 
investments. In May 2005, the European Parliament’s Regional Development Committee has 
expressed a strong support for the European Commission proposal to impose financial penalties 
on firms which have received EU funding but then decide to relocate. The Committee also asked 
for legal measures to ensure that firms receiving European subsidies do not relocate for a “long 
and predetermined” period. 
The central message of this paper is that the presumed negative effects of transferring part of 
production to cheap labour countries is not supported by theory - which is ambiguous - neither by 
the available empirical evidence - which does not find negative effects. Rather, very often the 
effects of this investment are found to be positive, particularly when compared to the base-line 
scenario of maintaining all production in the home country.  
Specifically, this paper examines the impact of outward investments to developing countries 
for a sample of French and Italian firms. The effect of these investments will be assessed in 
comparison to the alternative scenario of not investing abroad. In particular, we will look at the 
impact on the size (employment, output and value added) and on the efficiency (total factor 
productivity) of economic activities at home.  
Our analysis is nested in a broad model of investment decision, whereby a firm which has 
never invested abroad before faces a three way choice: staying national, investing in a cheap 
labour country or investing in an industrialised economy.  It is therefore possible to examine the 
effect of investing in a cheap labour country in comparison to the baseline of staying at home and 
also assess if the effects are different when a firm invests in an industrialised economy. This 
distinction according to the destination of the investment is important, as often the motives and consequently the effects of investing in the two areas can be radically different. Whereas 
investments in cheap labour countries are likely to be aimed at reducing production and 
specifically labour costs through the geographical fragmentation of the production chain (vertical 
investments), investments in large and developed economies normally aim at tapping the local 
market through a partial duplication of the activities carried out at home (horizontal investments). 
The effects on the home activities also take place through different channels, a change in factor 
use for vertical investments and a scale effect for horizontal ones. The empirical strategy we have 
devised, therefore, also examines if these different channels are indeed at work for the two types 
of investments.   
Our work builds on Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2003). This earlier paper focussed on 
Italy and looked at the effects of foreign investment independently of its destination. It found that 
firms investing abroad have higher total factor productivity and output growth, and no significant 
differences in employment growth than firms not investing abroad. It also showed that in order to 
isolate the effects of investing abroad on performance, it is important to construct an appropriate 
counterfactual: what would have happened to firms if they had not invested abroad. This was 
done by using propensity score matching.  
This paper has two major differences compared to this earlier work. First, it classifies 
investments according to their destination. It therefore disentangles the specific effect of 
investing in cheap labour countries. To do so it extends propensity score matching to the 
possibility of multiple treatment: investing in a developing country, investing in a developed 
country or staying at home. Second, it extends the analysis to France, therefore providing a 
broader picture of this process in continental Europe. Note that this paper focuses on FDI, and not 
on other looser forms of transferring production activities abroad, like for example 
subcontracting. 
The main finding is that there is no evidence of a negative effect of outward investments to 
cheap labour countries. In Italy they enhance the efficiency of home activities, with also positive 
long term effect on output and employment growth. This pattern is consistent with the theory of 
vertical investment. The geographical fragmentation of production is expected to change the 
factor mix of home activities, with a concentration on skill and technology intensive tasks. This 
may lead to an increase in productivity and value added in the short term. The consequent gains 
in efficiency could then enhance the competitiveness of investing firms leading to a long term expansion of home output and employment. For France we find a positive effect on the size of 
domestic activity, but no effect on productivity. One explanation of the different finding for the 
effect of investment of Italy and France towards LDC is that, the latter for France are not as 
clearly vertical FDI, as in the case of Italy. Investments to developed economies from both 
countries have instead essentially scale effects but which do not trickle down on productivity at 
home. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the literature. In 
section 3, we present our empirical setting. The data are described in section 4. The results of the 
empirical application are detailed in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature 
2.1. Available evidence 
Several earlier empirical works have examined the effects of outward FDI on output (Head and 
Ries, 2001; Blonigen, 2001), home employment (Brainard and Riker, 1997a and 1997b; 
Braconier and Eckholm, 2002; Konigs and Murphy, 2006; Bruno and Falzoni, 2000; Blomström 
et al., 1997; Lipsey, 1999; Mariotti et al., 2003; Marin, 2004), productivity (Braconier et al., 
2001; van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg, 2001). They generally find that the effect 
of FDI is positive or that short term costs get offset in the longer term.  However, these studies 
are based on sector/regional evidence or, when addressing the question at the firm-level, only 
focus on the activities of MNEs and thus fail to take into account the appropriate counterfactual 
to this problem. The counterfactual issue is properly addressed by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) 
which uses a similar methodology than Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2003) on a sample of 
Austrian firms. They find that firms investing abroad also raise their investments in R&D and in 
intangible assets at home. This methodology is also used by Debeare et al. (2006) for Korea and 
Hijzen et al. (2006) for France. Both papers study the effect of outward FDI on performance in 
the home country and differentiate this impact by destination country (low or high income 
country). 
In a very detailed analysis, Fontagné and Lorenzi (2005) show that relocations explain only 
10% of the deindustrialisation’s process observed in France. Besides, relocations represent less than 3% of the stock of French foreign direct investments. Our work is of course nested in the 
broader debate on the effects of outsourcing, which has grown considerably in the last few years, 
mostly in the US and in the UK. Most of these works measure outsourcing with the share of 
imported inputs and components. This is a comprehensive measure, as it captures both 
outsourcing done through FDI and through looser forms of foreign production like arm length 
agreements with local firms. Yet it does not capture the effect of investments which do not cause 
a replacement of domestic inputs or factors of production. This is the case for horizontal 
investments, but also for vertical ones when firms pursue the double target of abating production 
costs and acquiring market shares in the foreign market. Thus the results from this literature 
partly overlap and partly complement ours. 
That the share of outsourced production has been steadily increasing in the last couple of 
decades has been well documented by several studies (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, Hanson et al., 
2003; Hummels et al., 2001). Other studies have looked at the effects of outsourcing on the 
relative demand, wages and productivity of skilled and unskilled workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 
1996 and 1999, Geishecker and Görg, 2004). Görg et al. (2005) analyse the impact of outsourcing 
on productivity at the firm level. Working on a sample of Irish firm they are able to measure the 
share of imported material and service inputs on total inputs. They find that the outsourcing of 
material inputs has a positive effect on the productivity of exporting firms. In contrast the effect 
of outsourced services is non significant. The most comprehensive paper looking at the 
outsourcing of services is Amiti and Wei (2005) based on US and UK data. They find that 
particularly for the UK outsourcing has not led to employment losses neither in manufacturing 
nor in services.  
Summing up, the available evidence does not find that investments or a broader transfer of 
production to cheap labour countries have a negative effect on performance at home. It finds that 
it increases the skill premium, as firms reorganise their activities and replace low skill tasks with 
high skill ones. Yet the effects on total employment and productivity are normally positive or at 
worst non negative.  
 
2.2. Analytical framework 
 
How do investments abroad affect home activities? The models of Horizontal FDI (HFDI) 
and Vertical FDI (VFDI) show that several channels are at work and that the predicted effect on the home activities of the investing firm can often be positive and sometimes ambiguous. These 
channels work in three different domains: (i) the product market, (ii) the factor market, and (iii) 
technology transfer.  
Consider first the product market: how does investing abroad affect the competitiveness and 
consequently output and market share of the investing firm. In a vertical FDI, the short-term 
effect on home output is supposed to be negative as part of what was initially done at home 
relocated abroad. However, in the longer term, this effect could become positive as the firm, by 
reducing production costs, increases competitiveness, gains market shares and also expands home 
output. As shown in Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004), an accurate analysis of the effect on 
home output must take into account an appropriate counterfactual. Thus, simply looking at the 
dynamic of home output following the investment might not be particularly conclusive. If firms 
do not transfer part of their activities and if other firms do, as new low cost locations become 
available to foreign investors, integrated production in the home country could likely become a 
non viable option and the firm be pushed out of the market all together. As for HFDI, potential 
export flows get replaced by local production abroad. Consequently, home output declines. Yet, 
this effect could be reversed if the affiliate uses inputs or other complementary products from the 
home plant. Also, demand for headquarter services at home could rise with the expansion of 
foreign activities.    
Regarding factor market effects, the main concern is for the labour market, and more 
precisely for the effects on overall labour demand, on skill composition and on factor prices. 
Overall labour demand is derived from output demand. If output increases, this has positive 
effects on home employment both for VFDI and HFDI. But investments abroad may also change 
factor composition and particularly the skill mix of the labour force. Vertical FDI could reduce 
the demand for unskilled labour in the home economy and increase the demand for skilled labour, 
as emphasized by Head and Ries (2002) and Hanson (2001) and as also emerging from the 
evidence on outsourcing reported above. Factor prices should also be affected by these changes in 
factor demand. For horizontal FDI, the effects are less clear and the theory does not provide clear 
predictions on the sign of the changes in home factor demand.  
The last issue is the technology sourcing. Both HFDI and VFDI could lead to a technology 
transfer to home plants, in particular if MNEs locate their plants in knowledge intensive areas. 
Few studies have however analysed this spillover effect. Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) show a positive effect of outward investment flows on R&D activities and 
productivity in home plants. The scale effect discussed above may also have effects on 
productivity. If output rises we may expect an increase in efficiency of home plants because of 
economies of scale. In VFDI, parent company productivity could also increase following the 
overall cost-efficiency improvement of the MNE and the increasing specialisation in high-value 
added activities at home.  
Therefore, the available theory highlights several channels through which outward FDI may 
have positive effects on performance at home. In the empirical analysis that follows we 
particularly focus on the effects on total factor productivity, value added, output and 
employment. Given the data available, we are unable to also analyse the effects on the relative 
demand for inputs and specifically on the skill composition of labour. 
 
 
3.   Empirical setting 
 
The empirical implementation implies comparing the performance of a given firm which has 
transferred one or more stages of production to a foreign country, with the performance it would 
have had if it had kept integrated production at home. Of course the hypothetical benchmark of 
integrated production at home cannot be observed for firms which have fragmented production, 
and this poses several methodological problems. First, if we observe only MNEs we cannot 
single out the hypothetical benchmark: performance if the MNEs had not invested abroad. 
Second, if we observe only MNEs, we do not know if changes in performance are due to 
unobservable shocks equally affecting all firms, national and multinational alike. It is therefore 
important to benchmark MNEs to a sample of national firms. However, when comparing the 
performance of MNEs and national firms, we face a third problem: we do not know if differences 
are due to other characteristics of the two types of firms rather than to their being multinational or 
strictly national. In particular, foreign investments and performance are jointly determined. Given 
that investing abroad entices large costs, with imperfect financial markets only the (ex ante) most 
productive firms will invest abroad. The recent theoretical literature on the decision to export and 
invest abroad with heterogeneous firms establishes a very clear link between ex ante performance 
and international activities: entering international markets entail fixed costs and only the most 
profitable firms will be able to invest abroad (Helpman et al., 2004). Thus, if we observe that ex post MNEs perform better than national firms, we do not know if this is so because of foreign 
investments or because these firms performed better anyway, even before the investment.  
Figure 1 is derived from Clerides et al.’s (1998) paper on exporting firms’ performance. We 
adapt it to the case of foreign investments. We draw average hypothetical trajectories in home 
performance for three types of firms: those which are always MNEs, i.e. with at least one foreign 
subsidiary during all the period observed; those which never have a foreign subsidiary in the 
period observed (NATIONALs) and those that open their first foreign subsidiary in the period 
observed and therefore switch from being national into being MNEs (SWs) at time t . As 
mentioned above and according to the recent literature, MNEs perform better than national firms. 
More can be learned if we now focus on switching firms, those which invest for the first time at t. 
If the investment has a positive effect on productivity their trajectory becomes steeper at t and 
performance converges to the one of MNEs. Thus, our empirical question can be answered by 
comparing their trajectory after the investment to the one that they would have followed had they 
not invested. If the investment does indeed improve performance, this hypothetical trajectory lies 
below the one of the switching firms after t, as represented by the dotted line in figure 1. This 
comparison is important, as if we just focus on effective performance, even if we observe that it 
improves, this could be the outcome of other factors which have nothing to do with the 
investment. Unfortunately, the dotted line cannot be observed and we need to proxy it. National 
firms are a good candidate for the counterfactual. However, the trajectory of the appropriate 
counterfactual should indeed differ from the one of switching firms just because of the different 
investment decision. Due to the fixed costs on entry on international markets, a self-selection 
process will occur and only firms possessing some intangible capital giving them a competitive 
edge over national firms will invest abroad (Dunning, 1993; Markusen, 1995). Thus, switching 
firms are ex ante different from national ones and this difference may affect ex post performance. 
If we want to isolate the effect of investing, we need therefore to build a counterfactual made of a 
subsample of national firms which are as similar as possible to firms which have invested abroad.  
As firms choose endogenously whether to invest or not, this counterfactual could not be draw 
randomly. To overcome the problem of self-selection we use the method of propensity score 
matching, which aims at re-establishing the conditions of a natural experiment with non-
experimental data (Heckman et al., 1997; Blundell et al., 2004). This methodology has already 
been used in international economics to evaluate the effects of exporting and of acquisitions on firms’ performance and returns to scale by Arnold and Javorcik (2005), Arnold and Hussinger 
(2005), Girma et al. (2004), Girma et al. (2003), Wagner (2002) and Girma and Görg (2004). 
Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) use matching estimators to analyse the effects of outward 
investments on the decision to invest at home in tangible assets and in R&D. Here we extend 
Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2003) work on the effect of outward investments on home 
activities for a sample of Italian firms. The main idea is to estimate the probability of switching 
of each firm conditional on a number of observables (the propensity score). Then, for each of the 
firms which actually invest abroad, one can find one or more firms with a sufficiently close 
propensity score. The performance trajectory of this control group is the closest approximation to 
the dotted line.  
In this paper we have the additional problem that we want to control if investments to cheap 
labour countries, presumably of a vertical type, have different effects than investments to 
developed countries, most likely horizontal ones. For simplicity we dub cheap labour countries, 
which include developing and transition economies, as LDC and developed economies as DCs. 
Indeed firms face three options: staying at home, investing in LDC and investing in DC. 
Consequently, our outcome is not a binary indicator, and we face a multiple treatment problem 
(Lechner, 2001). We address this issue by estimating a multinomial logit and computing 
propensity scores for each of the three possible outcomes: not switching (denoted as outcome=0), 
investing in LDC (outcome=1) and investing in DC (outcome=2). With the propensity scores for 
choice 1 and 2, we can run the matching algorithm and find the appropriate counterfactual in both 
cases. Unlike the binary treatment case, when the outcome variable can take multiple values, each 
choice can be compared to more than one counterfactual. For example, when we evaluate the 
effect of switching into LDC (DC), we should take into account two possible counterfactual 
states: remaining national or switching into DC (LDC). Unfortunately, the low number of 
switching firms leaves very few choices of controls in the latter case and we could not obtain any 
accurate matching. Therefore, we will use national firms as a counterfactual to both firms 
switching in LDC and in DC, and our analysis allows us to tell whether and how switching in 
LDC or in DC affect performance relative to the hypothetical alternative of remaining national. 
Once we obtain adequate control groups for firms switching in LDC and in DC, we can 
compare their performance trajectory with the one of those actually switching, in order to gather 
an estimate of the effects of investing abroad. We do so by computing the difference between the switching and the counterfactual firms in the average mean of performance after the year of 
investment (which yields the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT), as indicated in the 
following equation: 
0 1 ˆ s t s t ATT y y + + − = α       ( 1 )  
where 
1
s t y +  is the mean performance of investing firms s periods after switching and 
0
s t y +  is a 
weighted mean of performance of the control group over the same period. 
In addition to the standard ATT estimator, we also use the difference-in-difference estimator 
(DID). Whereas the ATT estimator compares post-investment performance for the two groups of 
firms, the DID estimator compares the difference between pre- and post-investment performance 
in both groups. In other words, it measures the difference in the change of the steepness of the 
performance trajectories for the two groups of firms. Formally, DID is given by:  






− + − + − − − = t s t t s t DID y y y y α  
where upper bars denote averages in each group performances the year before and s years after 
the investment. DID estimator measures the differential performance in the group of investing 




4. Sample  and  data 
 
The empirical analysis carried out in this paper relies on two samples of French and Italian 
firms. To construct the French sample we used the 2002 version of the database “Enquêtes 
filiales” constructed by the Direction of Foreign Economic Relations (DREE) of the French 
Ministry of Economic and Finances, which provides the list of all affiliates of French firms and 
reports for each of them the year of investment and the chosen country. The panel used in this 
paper includes French firms with more than 20 employees investing abroad for the first time 
between 1995 and 2000. The Italian sample is drawn from the Reprint-dataset. Reprint is a 
directory, maintained by the Polytechnic of Milan and the Italian Institute for External Trade 
(ICE), which reports information on the identity and location of foreign affiliates of Italian 
                                                 
1 Like a first-difference estimator in linear panel data, the DID aims at eliminating unobserved heterogeneity which 
might not be captured by matching and can affect post investment performance. multinationals. We were able to identify a sample of firms which made their first investment 
abroad in the years 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000 or 2001. Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide an overview 
of our sample firms by year of their first investment abroad, the sector of activity of the investing 
parent and the area of destination of their first investment abroad. First, one may notice that the 
Italian sample is slightly larger than the French one, with a total 269 firms, out of which 174 
make their first investment in cheap labour countries and 95 switching towards DCs, while in the 
French case we have 171 foreign investors, out of which 80 make their first investment in LDCs.  
The larger number of switching firms in the Italian sample does not reflect the relative size of 
the two countries, but it might rather pick up the fact that France has a longer history of 
internationalization of production, while the share of Italian firms becoming multinationals in 
recent years has been growing quite rapidly. Interesting differences emerge in the geographical 
distribution of investments in the two countries. In particular, Italy reveals a much higher 
propensity towards investments in LDCs, while French firms are equally split between those 
investing in DCs and in LDCs. Furthermore, table 2 highlights that also within the two big areas 
there are differences among the firms from the two countries: within LDCs Italian firms exhibit a 
very high propensity to invest in Eastern Europe, while French firms have a relatively higher 
propensity to invest in other LDCs (mostly former French colonies or French speaking countries). 
As far as the distribution by sector of switching firms is concerned, table 3 suggests another 
important difference between France and Italy. While in the Italian case, there is remarkable 
difference in the distribution of firms switching towards LDCs and those switching in DCs (the 
former are relatively more concentrated in textiles and the latter in machinery, metalworking and 
chemicals), in the French case the distribution by sector does not seem to differ much. As we will 
argue later, this might reflect the fact that most Italian investment towards LDCs are indeed 
VFDI in sectors (such as textiles) where the process can be vertically fragmented and cheap 
labour is a key factor of production, while in the French case investments in LDCs may be more 
likely to mix up some HFDI and VFDI. Investments classified as ‘others’ are manufacturing 
investments carried out by wholesale companies. 
Information on foreign affiliates drawn from Reprint and “Enquêtes filiales” has been 
complemented with balance sheet data on parent companies gathered from Amadeus. From the 
same source we extracted balance sheet information for Italian and French-owned firms which had no foreign affiliates, nor invested abroad, in the period considered, which will be used to 




5.1. Construction of the counterfactual 
As discussed earlier, the first step of our empirical analysis is the construction of an 
appropriate counterfactual. In fact, the plain comparison of national and switching firms might 
yield very misleading outcomes due to the self-selection of investing firms. In other words, 
switching firms are likely to be very different from the average national firm. Table 4 provides a 
simple illustration of the ex-ante differences between those groups of firms. In particular, one 
may notice that switching firms are (on average) much larger (in terms of employment and sales) 
than firms remaining national. Remarkable differences emerge also in terms of TFP and labour 
productivity.  
The counterfactual will be derived from the sub-sample of national firms using the propensity 
score matching technique. Due to the very high number of national firms in Amadeus, if we were 
to run logit on the whole sample, we would get a very poor prediction of the probability of 
switching. Therefore, we choose to randomly select a smaller sample of national firms (25% of 
the original sample) and then run a multinomial logit regression of the probability of either 
remaining national, switching into LDC and switching into DC, as function of firms’ attributes 
such as size, age, TFP, return on investments, cost of labour per employee, the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities, and an vector of sectoral, regional
2 and year dummies. Explanatory 
variables are lagged one year. We run separate regression for the French and Italian samples 
pooling all observations from the various years. The results of the estimations are reported in 
table 5 and support the key role of TFP, which affects the probability of switching both in LDC 
and DC in both countries. In the case of France we also find that larger firms have a higher 
probability to invest both in LDC and DC, while higher wages (possibly capturing a skill 
premium) seem to affect the probability of switching towards DC. In the case of Italy, we find 
that size plays a role in investing in DC, while firms investing in LDC are not necessarily the 
larger ones. Furthermore, switching in LDC seems more likely in less profitable firms, suggesting 
                                                 
2 A dummy is included for each French department and for each Italian province. that switching towards LDC may be a defensive strategy. Unlike France, Italian firms investing 
abroad seem to be the ones paying lower average wages. 
The multinomial logit estimation allowed us to compute, for each firm, the probability of 
remaining national and the probability of switching into DC and LDC. With these propensity 
scores we were able to run our matching algorithm. We choose to run a nearest neighbour 
matching, which for each switching, finds the control firm with the closest propensity score. In 
addition, we perform our matching year-by-year and sector-by-sector. This ensures that each firm 
from sector j switching at time t is matched with an observation at time t from a firm within the 
same sector j. As discussed in section 3, we rely only on national firms as a counterfactual. We 
first run our matching algorithm on firms switching in DC, using national firms as a control 
group, then we matched firms switching in LDC, using again the sample of national firms as a 
control group.  
Matching techniques assume conditional independence that is we need to rule out that the 
choice of investing abroad is significantly affected by unobservable variables which also 
determine post-investment performance. This is not easy to ensure and test in empirical work, 
mainly due to data limitation. Here, we tried to control for as many observable firms’ 
characteristics as possible (including a large set of sector and regional dummies) given our data 
constraint. We reached a satisfactory result in terms of explained variance, as indicated by a 
pseudo-R
2 of 0.257 for the multinomial logit for France, and 0.192 for Italy, which is in line with 
most existing works using matching techniques. A good matching should also result in 
characteristics of the counterfactual as close as possible to those of the investing firms. In formal 
terms, the matched sample should satisfy the balancing property, that is, the distribution of the 
vector of observables should be balanced across switching and control firms. We ran various tests 
to verify that the balancing property holds. First, we checked that no significant differences in 
means remain in none of the characteristics used to compute the propensity scores between 
switching firms and the matched control. In table 6 we report the mean and standard deviation of 
these characteristics in the matched sample. T-tests, reported in the Appendix (Table A.1) 
confirm that differences between switching and matched control firms are not statistically 
different. Second, we tested for the equality of the distribution for all those variables in the 
switching and control groups. Results from a Kolmogorov-Smironov test of equality of 
distributions among treated and control groups (see Table A.1) do not reject the null hypothesis for any of the variable considered. Third, we ran separate binary logit on the samples of firms 
switching in LDC and in DC and relative controls. As shown in the appendix (Table A.2), we 
found that pseudo-R
2 drop significantly and regressors are jointly non-significant, supporting that 
no differences remain in the observable characteristics between investing firms and those 
remaining national after matching. 
 
5.2.  The effect of investing abroad 
 
Once defined the appropriate counterfactual, we are ready to test for the effects of investing 
abroad on performance at home in our samples of French and Italian firms. As we discussed 
above, we compute both the average treatment effect on firms switching towards LDC and to 
those switching to DC (ATT), but we also control for pre-switching dynamics of performance 
abroad by computing a difference-in-difference estimator (DID). Our outcome variables are four 
indicators of firms’ economic performances: output (measured by total sales), value added, 
employment, and TFP obtained as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas net output production function 
estimated for each 2-digit industry using the semi-parametric technique proposed by Levinshon 
and Petrin (2003). There are obvious relations among these indicators, such as for example the 
effect of an expansion in output on employment and on productive efficiency (through economies 
of scale), or the impact of an increase in TFP on output (through an increase of international 
competitiveness or employment via a factor mix reallocation). Here we just concentrate on a 
robust estimation of the partial effect of investing abroad on these indicators, without discussing 
their inter-linkages and the channels through which these effects occur. 
Figures 2 and 3 provide a visual representation of the effect of investing abroad. In each 
graph we depict the average performance of (French and Italian) firms switching in LDC and in 
DC, compared to their corresponding control group derived from the propensity score matching. 
As one would expect when matching is accurate, at t-1 (the year the matching exercise refers to) 
performance of switching and control groups are very close.
3 After the year of investment (t=0) 
the trajectories of switching firms lie always above the corresponding pattern for the control 
group, and in most cases this gap widens over time. While suggestive of some positive effects of 
switching on performance abroad, this visual evidence needs to be complemented with some 
                                                 
3 T-tests confirm that these differences are not different from zero.  econometrics on the magnitude and statistical significance of this gap. Results are presented in 
table 7. For our four indicators, we report the average difference in performance between the 
switching and the matched controls in the first year following the investment (i.e. in t+1), as well 
as over a two and three years horizon. DID is computed by comparing post-investment 
performance at the various time horizons with the corresponding value two-years prior to 
switching (i.e. the year before our matching exercise). The number of cases available for the 
estimation varies for each variable and time frame, due to missing values. Standard errors for 
these means are computed by bootstrapping (100 repetitions) 
The main result from our empirical analysis is that we do not find any convincing evidence of 
negative effects of investing abroad on firms’ performance. This result is robust to many 
alternative specifications of the selection equation and different matching strategies. On the 
contrary, we have some evidence that firms investing abroad for the first time increase 
productivity, output and employment at home, as opposed to their counterfactual, and this gap 
seems to widen over time.  
As for FDI to LDCs we observe a relatively different pattern for the two countries. In Italy we 
find that firms that create their first foreign plant in a LDC experience a significant increase in 
TFP: three years after their investment, TFP is on average 8.8% higher than the one of the control 
group. This is consistent with the idea that vertical investments allow to move the (low-skill) 
labour-intensive activities to cheap labour countries, keeping the high-value added activities in 
the home country. The dynamics of value added in the Italian firms switching towards LDC 
would confirm this prediction. In fact, our result suggest that value added grows faster in the 
latter group of firms that in the control group. Finally, we have some evidence that employment 
drops just after investment (however the effect is not statistically significant), but it rapidly 
recovers, such that three years after investment employment would be 8.1% higher than in the 
control group. This is likely to follow from the dynamics of output, which after controlling for 
pre-investment values (DID), remain rather stable in the aftermath of the investment, but three 
years later output in the switching firms is on average 8.8% percent higher than in the control 
group (but still with a relatively large standard error). Also these results are anyway consistent 
with the prediction of the VFDI model that fragmentation may lead to a short term increase in 
home efficiency as labour intensive activities are transferred abroad and then to long term gains 
in competitiveness, output and employment. The results for France are not as clear cut. Investing firms have higher output and employment than their counterfactual, but the effects on value 
added and TFP are not significant. Our results on employment are slightly different from the ones 
obtained by Hijzen et al. (2006) who find that investing in low income locations does not induce 
an immediate positive employment effect, but is associated with a positive effect from t+2 
onwards. One way to interpret the different findings for Italy and France in the effects of 
switching towards LDC is that, as we have discussed earlier, in the former country investment 
towards LDC are indeed a good proxy of vertical FDI, while in the latter, they may be more a 
mix of horizontal and vertical FDI. This hypothesis finds some support in the distribution of 
investing firms by geographical area of destination (of the affiliates) and sector of origin (of the 
parent) in both countries. As shown in table 2, within LDC, Italian firms seem to prefer Eastern 
European countries, which are mostly characterized by small (although growing) markets and 
low cost of labour, while French FDI are relatively more concentrated in other LDC countries 
(which possibly include some former French colonies). Similar considerations can be drawn from 
the distribution of FDI by sector. Table 3 shows rather clearly that a large proportion of Italian 
firms switching towards LDC are indeed concentrated in textile industries (where vertical 
fragmentation of production is possible and convenient) while firms switching in DC are 
disproportionately concentrated in Machinery and Chemicals (where market access FDI are more 
likely). On the contrary, in the French case, the sectoral distribution of firms switching in LDC 
and DC is not so remarkably different.  
As for investments to DCs, here we find a consistent evidence both for France and Italy. 
Firms investing in DC experience a higher turnover after investment relative to the control group 
and especially in the case of France this is associated with significantly higher employment. 
Furthermore, this growth gap widens over time: the year after switching, output in the treated 
group is about 14.6% higher than in the control group in France (and 13.6% in Italy), while this 
difference reaches 25.5% (18.9%) three years after investment. This is consistent with the idea 
that investments in developed countries allow for a better access to foreign markets, thus 
fostering the need for headquarter services and export of intermediates from the parent company 
to the subsidiaries, as well as with a bandwagon effect on other products of the investing firms, 
still produced in the home country. It is worth mentioning that significant positive effects on 
employment at home are observed in firms switching towards DC, both in France and Italy. These results are consistent with the HFDI model, whereby most of the gains expected from FDI 






This paper studies the effects of foreign investments on home economies. We compare the 
home performance of a sample of French and Italian firms which have invested abroad for the 
first time in the period observed to the one of a counterfactual of firms which have not invested 
abroad. We distinguish between investments in cheap labour countries and in advanced countries. 
This distinction is important for two reasons. The first one is that the former are of greater policy 
concern, as there is a generalised fear in continental Europe that investments to cheap labour 
countries are used to displace production and accelerate the on-going process of de-
industrialisation, especially in manufacturing.  The second one is that the distinction between the 
areas of destination partly reflects different investment motives. Investments towards cheap 
labour countries generally reflect the aim of saving on labour costs and they are of a vertical type, 
which also implies a geographical fragmentation of production. Investments towards developed 
countries are normally market seeking, they are therefore of a horizontal type, implying a partial 
or complete duplication of production stages at home and abroad. These different types of 
investments are also expected to have different effects on the home activities. Vertical investment 
essentially causes a change in the factor mix of production at home and a shift towards skill 
intensive activities. Horizontal investment affects home productivity, output and employment 
through scale effects.  
The problem of this type of analysis is of course defining the right counterfactual. For the 
welfare of the home country what matters is what would have happened to investing firms if they 
had not invested. By using  propensity score matching, we can construct a counterfactual of 
national firms that never invest abroad which replicates this hypothetical performance. A note of 
caution is required. Given this framework our results do not measure the sign of the absolute 
performance of the firms analysed, in other words whether their absolute performance has 
                                                 
4 In the appendix we also report some robustness checks. In particular, we report the results of estimations carried out 
excluding the ‘other’ sector, which might include non manufacturing investments, and we also focus on a subsample 
of switching-control pairs for which we have data from t-2 to t+3. improved or worsened. They merely say whether, whatever the sign of the absolute performance, 
the relative performance is different for investing and non investing firms.  
The main finding is that there is no evidence of a negative effect of outward investments to 
cheap labour countries. In Italy, they enhance the efficiency of home activities, with also positive 
long term effect on output and employment growth. This pattern is consistent with the theory of 
vertical investment. The geographical fragmentation of production is expected to change the 
factor mix of home activities, with a concentration on skill and technology intensive tasks. This 
may lead to an increase in productivity and value added in the short term. The consequent gains 
in efficiency could then enhance the competitiveness of investing firms leading to a long term 
expansion of home output and employment. For France we find a positive effect on the size of 
domestic activity, but no significant effects on productivity. This may have to do with the fact 
that French FDI towards LDC seem to be less frequently of the vertical type. Investments to 
developed economies from both countries have instead essentially scale effects but which do not 
trickle down on productivity at home. These findings imply that foreign investment is often a 
strategic moves undertaken to strengthen home activities. In this perspective, actions aimed at 
discouraging foreign investments and the creation of foreign employments seem short sighted 
and they risk at weakening the domestic economy rather than strengthening it.    References 
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Figure 2a – Performance trajectories of firms switching towards LDC  
and matched controls: France 
  
  






Figure 2b – Performance trajectories of firms switching towards DC  
and matched controls: France 
  
  























































































































































































Figure 3a – Performance trajectories of firms switching towards LDC  








Figure 3b – Performance trajectories of firms switching towards DC  
and matched controls: Italy 
 
  









































































































































































































Table 1 - Distribution of French and Italian switching firms, by year 
 










1993     10  11 
1995 9  7  35  16 
1996 10  29     
1997 17  16  54  30 
1998 21  14     
1999 14  12  53  24 
2000 9  13  22  14 
Total  80  91 174 95 
   26
 
Table 2 - Distribution of French and Italian switching firms, by  






Asia 17.5  16.9 
Eastern Europe  46.3  60.5 
Latin America  11.3  7.9 
Other LDC  25.0  14.7 
Total LDC  100  100 
EU 61.5  71.7 
North America  14.3  13.1 
Other DC  24.2  15.2 








Table 3 - Distribution of French and Italian switching firms, by sector (%) 
 














DA: Food, beverages and tobacco  8.8 8.8 5.8 5.3 
DB: Textiles  10.0  6.6  24.1  10.5 
DC:  Leather  0.0 0.0 8.6 4.2 
DD:  Wood  1.3 2.2 2.9 2.1 
DE: Pulp, paper and publishing  3.8 3.3 1.7 5.3 
DG:  Chemicals  7.5 12.1 4.0 10.5 
DH: Rubber and plastic  6.3 3.3 2.9 3.2 
DI: Other non-metallic mineral products  2.5  0.0 5.2 4.2 
DJ: Basic metals and fabricated metal  12.5  8.8  6.9  14.7 
DK: Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  12.5  13.2 14.4 19.0 
DL: Electrical and optical equipment 11.3  16.5  2.9  10.5 
DM: Transport equipment  1.3 4.4 2.9 4.2 
DN: Manufacturing n.e.c.  3.8 2.2 7.5 2.1 
GA: Others (*)  18.8  18.7  10.3  4.2 
Total  100 100 100 100 
     (*) Manufacturing investment of wholesales  









Table 4 – Descriptive statistics on national and switching firms 
 
 National  firms 
Firms switching  
to LDC 
Firms switching 
 to DC 
 France 
Nb. obs.  28'645   80  91 
 mean  std.dev  mean  std.dev  mean  std.dev 
Nb. of employees  89  (242)  241  (334)  326  (513) 
Turnover 21'411  (77'498) 80'125  (157'318) 94'614  (165'283) 
TFP 1.2  (1.2)  1.9  (1.4)  2.0  (1.6) 
Value added per employee  44.4  (38.5)  58.9  (29.3)  69.4  (59.6) 
Cost of labour per employee  32.0  (11.2)  37.7  (10.1)  41.4  (17.4) 
Age 24.9  (20.2)  31.8  (23.4)  25.6  (22.0) 
ROI 6.7  (11.0)  7.1  (7.2)  8.0  (8.4) 
Current ratio  1.5  (0.8)  1.6  (1.1)  1.7  (1.1) 
 Italy 
Nb. obs.  17'219  174  95 
 mean  std.dev  mean  std.dev  mean  std.dev 
Nb. of employees  71  (207)  142  (188)  304  (484) 
Turnover 15'831  (57'242) 30'468  (37'160)  69'754  (105'413) 
TFP 1.6  (1.0)  2.2  (1.7)  3  (2.7) 
Value added per employee  50.1  (29.2)  61.8  (66.2)  70.9  (75.3) 
Cost of labour per employee  29.8  (10.2)  29.4  (9.0)  33.6  (10.0) 
Age 22.1  (14.5)  24.2  (15.7)  27.4  (15.2) 
ROI 6.5  (8.4)  6.1  (5.9)  7.5  (7.4) 
Current ratio  1.3  (0.7)  1.3  (0.5)  1.3  (0.5) 








Table 5 – Probability of switching for French and Italian firms 
 
 Multinomial  Logit 
 France  Italy 
  Coef.  Std. Err.    Coef.  Std. Err.   
Switching in LDC            
Log TFPi, t-1 1.577  (0.421)  ***  2.001  (0.264)  ***
Log Nb. Employees i, t-1 0.524  (0.138)  ***  0.078  (0.106)   
Log Cost of labour per employeei, t-1 0.949 (0.644)    -1.299  (0.417)  ***
Log Agei, t-1 0.326  (0.140)  **  0.256  (0.117)  ** 
Return on investments i, t-1 0.013  (1.312)    -3.841  (1.033)  ***
Current ratio i, t-1 -0.050  (0.146)    -0.319  (0.160)  ** 
Switching in DC            
Log TFPi, t-1 1.336  (0.396)  ***  2.170  (0.401)  ***
Log Nb. Employees i, t-1 0.520  (0.117)  ***  0.495  (0.141)  ***
Log Cost of labour per employeei, t-1 1.176 (0.565)  **  -1.703  (0.635)  ***
Log Agei, t-1 -0.090  (0.118)    0.323  (0.152)  ** 
Return on investments i, t-1 -0.443  (1.196)    -2.056  (1.543)   
Current ratio i, t-1 -0.010  (0.119)    -0.186  (0.191)   
Sector dummies  yes  yes 
Regional dummies  yes  yes 
Year dummies  yes  yes 
Number of obs 28816  17488 
LR chi2(238) 598.34  601.59 
Pseudo R2 0.2567  0.1923 
Log likelihood -866.217  -1263.77 
    Asterisks denote significance at 1%  (***), 5%  (**) and 10% (*).  






Table 6 – Descriptive statistics on matched controls and switching firms 
 
 
CFT to Firms  
Switching to LDC 
Firms switching  
to LDC 
CFT to Firms  
Switching to DC 
Firms switching 
 to DC 
  France 
Nb. obs.  71  82 
 mean  std.dev  mean  std.dev  mean std.dev mean std.dev 
Nb. of employees  226.9  (311.6)  207.8  (283.5)  386.4  (749.8)  274.5  (420.9) 
Turnover 68'760.7  (120'004.2)  70'435.6  (150'456.2) 106'859.9 (230'825.4)  84'030.4  (155'490.9)
TFP 1.7  (1.2)  1.7  (1.0)  1.9  (1.6)  2.0  (1.6) 
Labour prod.  54.9  (31.8)  55.8  (26.0)  63.7  (39.2)  69.7  (62.7) 
Labour cost  37.9  (12.3)  37.6  (10.3)  41.2  (14.2)  41.1  (18.1) 
Age 33.0  (32.0)  31.6  (23.5)  32.5  (27.2)  26.2  (22.7) 
ROI 8.1  (8.6)  6.9  (7.1)  7.9  (9.5)  8.0  (8.8) 
Current ratio  1.6  (0.8)  1.6  (1.1)  1.7  (0.8)  1.7  (1.1) 
  Italy 
Nb. obs.  161  87 
 mean  std.dev  mean  std.dev  mean std.dev mean std.dev 
Nb. of employees  89  (93)  115  (127)  298.6  (811)  278.1  (473) 
Turnover 19'838  (28'294)  26'702  (33'957)  59703  (117'327)  63080  (103'799) 
TFP 1.8  (1.0)  2.1  (1.7)  2.4  (1.4)  2.6  (1.5) 
Labour prod.  52.2  (25.1)  62.2  (68.5)  58.5  (25.7)  63.5  (32.6) 
Labour cost  28.5  (8.3)  29.3  (9.1)  32.6  (6.5)  33.1  (8.8) 
Age 22  (14.4)  23.8  (15.5)  33.4  (24.9)  26.4  (14.5) 
ROI 6.7  (6.6)  6  (6.1)  7.4  (10.3)  7.7  (7.6) 
Current ratio  1.3  (0.6)  1.3  (0.5)  1.3  (0.6)  1.4  (0.5)   30
Table 7 - The effect of investing abroad on performance at home: France vs. Italy 
  France Italy 
  The effect of switching  in LDC  The effect of switching in DC  The effect of switching in LDC  The effect of switching in DC 
  Nb. Coef. Std.  Err.    Nb.  Coef.  Std.  Err.    Nb.  Coef.  Std. Err.    Nb.  Coef.  Std. Err.   
TFP growth                                 
ATT 1-year  67  0.010  (0.056)    77  0.102  (0.054)  *  143  0.075  (0.044)  *  81  0.066  (0.057)   
ATT 2-years  61  0.015  (0.057)    70  0.121  (0.061)  **  131  0.083  (0.046)  *  72  0.099  (0.061)  * 
ATT 3-years  51  0.001  (0.060)    56  0.131  (0.085)    98  0.088  (0.050)  *  60  0.083  (0.057)   
DID 1-year  51  -0.010  (0.055)    56  0.002  (0.035)    118  0.061  (0.030)  **  69  0.102  (0.034)  *** 
DID 2-years  45  0.014  (0.055)       50  0.058  (0.047)    106  0.063  (0.037)  *  60  0.130  (0.053)  ** 
DID 3-years  35  -0.025  (0.066)    37  0.080  (0.072)    75  0.062  (0.041)    48  0.091  (0.035)  *** 
Value Added growth                               
ATT 1-year  70  0.134  (0.157)    81  0.185  (0.147)    155  0.066  (0.090)    84  0.088  (0.091)   
ATT 2-years  69  0.157  (0.148)    79  0.214  (0.172)    149  0.115  (0.114)    80  0.199  (0.095)  ** 
ATT 3-years  56  0.107  (0.186)    66  0.288  (0.157)  *  122  0.115  (0.120)    71  0.125  (0.089)   
DID 1-year  60  0.059  (0.050)    72  0.087  (0.051)  *  133  0.069  (0.037)  *  73  0.146  (0.046)  *** 
DID 2-years  59  0.060  (0.050)    70  0.139  (0.060)  **  127  0.113  (0.048)  **  69  0.264  (0.063)  *** 
DID 3-years  46  0.058  (0.081)    57  0.202  (0.075)  ***  101  0.118  (0.049)  **  60  0.211  (0.069)  *** 
Turnover growth                              
ATT 1-year  70  0.254  (0.210)    82  0.211  (0.187)    159  0.192  (0.104)  *  83  0.135  (0.086)   
ATT 2-years  70  0.306  (0.211)    78  0.247  (0.207)    150  0.204  (0.103)  **  82  0.129  (0.097)   
ATT 3-years  61  0.264  (0.209)    66  0.305  (0.174)  *  121  0.255  (0.101)  **  73  0.198  (0.105)  * 
DID 1-year  59  0.080  (0.036)  **  72  0.146  (0.040)  ***  138  0.017  (0.031)    73  0.136  (0.046)  *** 
DID 2-years  59  0.117  (0.045)  ***  68  0.203  (0.051)  ***  129  0.018  (0.037)    72  0.135  (0.062)  ** 
DID 3-years  50  0.050  (0.073)    56  0.255  (0.063)  ***  101  0.088  (0.040)  **  63  0.189  (0.058)  *** 
Employment growth                              
ATT 1-year  71  0.066  (0.181)    82  0.126  (0.177)    156  -0.030  (0.117)    85  0.011  (0.086)   
ATT 2-years  69  0.101  (0.143)    79  0.153  (0.194)    146  -0.005  (0.099)    83  0.083  (0.086)   
ATT 3-years  58  0.105  (0.181)    67  0.224  (0.183)    118  0.061  (0.105)    73  0.035  (0.097)   
DID 1-year  54  0.072  (0.035)  **  62  0.127  (0.039)  ***  134  -0.024  (0.034)    73  0.047  (0.044)   
DID 2-years  52  0.087  (0.045)  *  60  0.158  (0.040)  ***  124  0.020  (0.035)    71  0.158  (0.049)  *** 
DID 3-years  41  0.096  (0.056)  *  48  0.203  (0.054)  ***  97  0.081  (0.046)  *  61  0.148  (0.053)  *** 




Table A.1 – Testing for the balancing property: test for difference in means and distribution between switching and controls in the 
matched samples  
 
    

















Sample of firms switching towards 
LDC and matched controls               
Log TFPi, t-1 142  0.032  (0.095) 0.127  [0.55]  322  0.034  (0.058)  0.094  [0.51] 
Log Nb. Employees I, t-1 142  0.005  (0.192) 0.113  [0.70]  322  0.000  (0.110)  0.198  [0.01] 
Log Cost of labour per employeei, t-1 142  0.010  (0.049) 0.085  [0.94]  322  0.028  (0.033)  0.106  [0.36] 
Log Agei, t-1 142  0.095  (0.144) 0.141  [0.41]  322  0.085  (0.076)  0.124  [0.19] 
Return on investments I, t-1 142  0.008  (0.015) 0.113  [0.70]  322  -0.005  (0.009)  0.127  [0.17] 
Current ratio i, t-1 142  0.001  (0.155) 0.141  [0.41]  322  0.020  (0.060)  0.099  [0.44] 
Sample of firms switching towards DC 
and matched controls                     
Log TFPi, t-1 164  0.067  (0.093) 0.139  [0.35]  174  0.023  (0.076)  0.104  [0.72] 
Log Nb. Employees I, t-1 164  0.066  (0.203) 0.151  [0.25]  174  0.008  (0.182)  0.107  [0.69] 
Log Cost of labour per employeei, t-1 164  0.002  (0.005) 0.127  [0.46]  174  -0.012  (0.034)  0.080  [0.94] 
Log Agei, t-1 164  -0.247  (0.139) 0.191  [0.07]  174  -0.163  (0.116)  0.182  [0.10] 
Return on investments I, t-1 164  -0.001  (0.015) 0.155  [0.23]  174  0.011  (0.012)  0.164  [0.18] 
Current ratio i, t-1 164  -0.009  (0.120) 0.143  [0.31]  174  0.066  (0.086)  0.139  [0.35] 
Notes: 
* Difference-in-mean test is the estimated coefficient of a regression of each variable on a dummy taking value 1 for switching firms and 0 for 
the matched control. 
** Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distribution of each variable in the groups of switching firms and matching controls. 






Table A.2 – Testing for the balancing property: logit on the probability of switching in the matched samples 
 
 France  Italy 
  Binary logit  Binary logit  Binary logit  Binary logit 
 
Switching to LDC 
vs CFT 
Switching to DC 
vs CFT 
Switching to LDC 
vs CFT 
Switching to DC 
vs CFT 
  Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err.    Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err.
Log TFPi, t-1  0.005 (0.413)  0.171 (0.352)    0.167 (0.337)  0.078 (0.555) 
Log Nb. Employees i, t-1 -0.022  (0.183)  0.100 (0.137)    -0.081  (0.135)  0.023  (0.186) 
Log Cost of labour per employeei, t-1 0.162  (0.717) -0.034 (0.590)   0.135 (0.517)  -0.176  (0.925) 
Log Agei, t-1 0.146  (0.215)  -0.368 (0.199)  * 0.175  (0.177)  -0.286  (0.212) 
Return on investments i, t-1  0.997 (2.056) -0.095 (1.811)   -1.221 (1.653)  0.909 (2.363) 
Current ratio i, t-1 -0.024  (0.190)  0.055 (0.223)    0.066  (0.220)  0.199  (0.283) 
Number of obs 142   164     322   174  
LR chi2(238) 0.82   4.39     2.54   3.16  
Prob > chi2 0.9915   0.624     0.8639   0.788  
Pseudo R2 0.0042   0.019     0.0057   0.013  
Log likelihood -98.017   -111.5     -221.923   -119  
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Table A.3 - The effect of investing abroad on performance at home: France vs Italy  (excluding the sector “Others”) 
  France Italy 
  The effect of switching in LDC  The effect of switching in DC  The effect of switching in LDC  The effect of switching in DC 
  Nb.  Coef.  Std. Err.    Nb.  Coef.  Std. Err.    Nb.  Coef.  Std. Err.    Nb. Coef.  Std. Err.   
TFP        
ATT  1-year  56  -0.052  (0.086)    57  0.112 (0.075)    128 0.085 (0.045)  *  77 0.058  (0.059)   
ATT  2-years  53  -0.161  (0.078)  **  55  0.100 (0.077)    117 0.095 (0.039)  **  68 0.082  (0.061)   
ATT  3-years  42  -0.157  (0.073)  **  45  0.097 (0.083)    90  0.122 (0.061)  **  56 0.078  (0.064)   
DID  1-year  41  0.007  (0.066)    41  0.054 (0.041)    104 0.064 (0.032)  **  66 0.089  (0.037)  *** 
DID  2-years  38  -0.056  (0.070)    39  0.062 (0.042)    93  0.068 (0.042)  *  57 0.103  (0.051)  ** 
DID  3-years  27  -0.007  (0.055)    31  0.082 (0.066)    68  0.097 (0.045)  **  45 0.077  (0.035)  *** 
Value Added                               
ATT  1-year  57  -0.015  (0.179)    62  0.235 (0.178)    138 0.179 (0.099)  *  80 0.095  (0.097)   
ATT  2-years  55  -0.115  (0.218)    62  0.258 (0.181)    133 0.228 (0.113)  **  76 0.199  (0.091)  ** 
ATT  3-years  45  -0.221  (0.245)    52  0.183 (0.187)    111 0.218 (0.122)  *  67 0.141  (0.093)   
DID  1-year  46  0.113  (0.075)    55  0.186 (0.047)  ***  117 0.085 (0.035)  **  70 0.148  (0.055)  *** 
DID  2-years  44  0.054  (0.074)    55  0.228 (0.051)  ***  112 0.135 (0.042)  ***  66 0.254  (0.062)  *** 
DID  3-years  34  -0.001  (0.074)    45  0.266 (0.067)  ***  91  0.145 (0.044)  ***  57 0.216  (0.070)  *** 
Turnover                               
ATT  1-year  55  0.180  (0.273)    63  0.172 (0.216)    141 0.276 (0.108)  ***  79 0.148  (0.107)   
ATT  2-years  56  0.227  (0.276)    62  0.238 (0.192)    133 0.325 (0.114)  ***  78 0.136  (0.100)   
ATT  3-years  49  0.171  (0.255)    53  0.170 (0.186)    108 0.353 (0.114)  ***  69 0.230  (0.108)  ** 
DID  1-year  45  0.104  (0.058)  *  55  0.169 (0.040)  ***  121 0.025 (0.039)    70 0.137  (0.044)  *** 
DID  2-years  45  0.112  (0.067)  *  54  0.262 (0.049)  ***  113 0.053 (0.044)    69 0.125  (0.054)  ** 
DID  3-years  38  0.031  (0.093)    45  0.281 (0.049)  ***  89  0.125 (0.055)  **  60 0.200  (0.062)  *** 
Employment                               
ATT  1-year  57  -0.002  (0.187)    62  0.144 (0.211)    139 0.107 (0.102)    81 0.034  (0.087)   
ATT  2-years  55  0.004  (0.225)    61  0.185 (0.180)    130 0.148 (0.111)    79 0.103  (0.115)   
ATT  3-years  47  -0.039  (0.226)    53  0.196 (0.203)    105 0.232 (0.110)  **  69 0.064  (0.098)   
DID  1-year  42  0.102  (0.042)  **  46  0.120  (0.032) ***  118  -0.017  (0.030)   70 0.070  (0.043)  * 
DID  2-years  40  0.097  (0.051)  *  45  0.203 (0.055)  ***  109 0.025 (0.044)    68 0.175  (0.048)  *** 
DID  3-years  32  0.047  (0.069)    37  0.249 (0.077)  ***  85  0.079 (0.052)    58 0.168  (0.058)  *** 
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped (100 rep.). Asterisks denote significance levels at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*)   34
Table A.4 - The effect of investing abroad on performance at home: France vs Italy (“balanced” sample) 
  France Italy 
 
The effect of switching  
in LDC 
The effect of switching  
in DC 
The effect of switching  
in LDC 
The effect of switching  
in DC 
  Nb.  Coef.  Std. Err.    Nb.  Coef.  Std. Err.    Nb.  Coef.  Std. Err.    Nb.  Coef.  Std. Err.   
TFP            
ATT 1-year  35  -0.027  (0.064)    37  0.073  (0.082)    75  0.055  (0.062)    48  0.126 (0.066)  * 
ATT 2-years  35  -0.018 (0.070)    37 0.126  (0.099)    75  0.084  (0.063)    48  0.139 (0.083)  * 
ATT 3-years  35  -0.034 (0.079)    37 0.161  (0.110)    75  0.081  (0.065)    48  0.089 (0.061)   
DID 1-year  35  -0.019 (0.056)    37  -0.008  (0.047)    75  0.036  (0.030)    48  0.128 (0.034)  *** 
DID 2-years  35  -0.010 (0.071)    37 0.046  (0.061)    75  0.065  (0.037)  *  48  0.141 (0.058)  ** 
DID 3-years  35  -0.025 (0.066)    37 0.080  (0.072)    75  0.055  (0.062)    48  0.091 (0.035)  ** 
Value Added                              
ATT 1-year  46  0.109  (0.182)    57  0.166  (0.192)    101  0.050 (0.129)    60 0.068  (0.105)   
ATT 2-years  46  0.078 (0.184)    57  0.210 (0.187)    101  0.096 (0.129)    60  0.131 (0.112)   
ATT 3-years  46  0.083 (0.199)    57  0.278 (0.188)    101  0.094 (0.134)    60  0.097 (0.099)   
DID 1-year  46  0.084 (0.059)    57  0.090 (0.052)  *  101  0.074 (0.037)  **  60  0.182 (0.050)  *** 
DID 2-years  46  0.053 (0.063)    57  0.134 (0.068)  **  101  0.120 (0.047)  **  60  0.245 (0.070)  *** 
DID 3-years  46  0.058 (0.081)    57  0.202 (0.075)  *** 101  0.118 (0.049)  **  60  0.211 (0.069)  *** 
Turnover                              
ATT 1-year  50  0.348  (0.253)    56  0.179  (0.181)    101  0.181 (0.117)    63 0.226  (0.111)  ** 
ATT 2-years  50  0.362  (0.260)    56  0.234  (0.179)    101  0.201 (0.119)  *  63  0.236 (0.113)  ** 
ATT 3-years  50  0.300  (0.254)    56  0.266  (0.180)    101  0.232 (0.121)  *  63  0.243 (0.110)  ** 
DID 1-year  50  0.097  (0.049)  **  56  0.168  (0.043)  ***  101  0.036 (0.035)    63  0.173 (0.039)  *** 
DID 2-years  50  0.111  (0.058)  *  56  0.224  (0.054)  ***  101  0.056 (0.040)    63  0.183 (0.049)  *** 
DID 3-years  50  0.050  (0.073)    56  0.255  (0.063)  ***  101  0.088 (0.040)  **  63  0.189 (0.058)  *** 
Employment                              
ATT  1-year  41 0.100  (0.277)    48 -0.006  (0.236)    97  -0.049 (0.126)    61  -0.065 (0.101)   
ATT 2-years  41  0.101 (0.274)    48  0.022 (0.234)    97  0.003 (0.125)    61  0.023 (0.097)   
ATT 3-years  41  0.103 (0.276)    48  0.070 (0.228)    97  0.042 (0.127)    61  0.015 (0.102)   
DID 1-year  41  0.093 (0.038)  **  48  0.127 (0.038)  *** 97  -0.011 (0.035)    61  0.067 (0.044)   
DID 2-years  41  0.095 (0.045)  **  48  0.156 (0.045)  *** 97  0.042 (0.039)    61  0.156 (0.046)  *** 
DID 3-years  41  0.096 (0.056)  *  48  0.203 (0.054)  *** 97  0.081 (0.046)  *  61  0.148 (0.053)  *** 
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped (100 rep.). Asterisks denote significance levels at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). ‘Balanced’ sample is 
defined by all the switching-control pairs with no missing values between t-2 and t+3. 